---

The Kruger Telegram - Part 1

  I express my sincere congratulations that, supported by your people, without appealing for the help of friendly Powers, you have succeeded by your own energetic action against armed bands which invaded your country as disturbers of the peace, and have thus been enabled to restore peace and safeguard the independence of the country against attacks from the outside.*)


*) Kayser's original draft contained the words ' the dignity of your Government '. The alteration to ' independence of the country against attacks from the outside ' is in Marschall's own handwriting.

---

Private.

From the curtness of your telegram of the 3rd I get the impression that you are hiding something unpleasant. Please telegraph to me privately something to show how your conversation with Lord Salisbury went. Rest assured that our action will not be governed by our feelings and mood, in spite of pressure from the colonial party and elsewhere. But we must know where we are.


Telegram. Private for Baron von Holstein.

I have hidden nothing unpleasant whatever. Lord Salisbury was forthcoming, and continued to be so, when I said that I had been instructed to hand him a note, and was glad that recent events relieved me of the necessity of presenting it. He enquired about our interests in the Transvaal in detail, and I informed him, on the authority of information received from Herr Goerz, that we had over 500 Millions (of Marks) of German capital invested there, and there were about 15,000 Germans in Johannesburg. He fully understood that the situation there must be of some interest for us. This time also his words showed but little sympathy for Rhodes and his ambitions, and he remarked with a certain satisfaction, that he heard that Rhodes's position seemed to be shaken. His satisfaction was evident when he said that he hoped that the whole Transvaal difficulty was now over.

I was not more explicit in my official telegram of yesterday, because I had already reported more than once on Lord Salisbury's friendly attitude. If up to yesterday there had been a change and especially if anything unpleasant had occurred, I should have felt it my duty to report at once. Moreover, it was after my meeting with Lord Salisbury that I received the text of His Majesty's congratulatory telegram, and could not help, from my knowledge of conditions here, foreseeing the effect which its inevitable publication would have, and has had, on public opinion here. All the English newspapers, with the single exception of the Daily News, describe the message as an act of unfriendliness towards England, and even the Standard speaks out sharply about it. This change is all the more striking, as, so far, the whole of the London Press, with hardly an exception, decidedly blamed Dr. Jameson's action. Whether Lord Salisbury will be able, supposing this feeling remains or even becomes more acute, to maintain fully his present attitude towards us, and whether for his own sake he will not feel obliged to act with more energy against the Boers, so as to avoid the appearance here of retreating before Germany, are questions which I cannot answer with any certainty, until I meet him again — probably on Wednesday. To-day this much appears certain. The present revulsion of public opinion, as shown in the Press to-day, makes his task of treating the question before him as far as possible in a friendly spirit considerably harder.


Telegram.

The British Ambassador mentioned to-day the unfavourable impression which His Majesty's telegram to President Kruger had made on British public opinion. I replied that I must decidedly take exception to the view adopted by the British Press, that the telegram implied hostility to England and an invasion of her rights. In the matter of rights the German was very sensitive; he had no wish to infringe foreign rights, but he demanded that his own should be respected. It could not possibly be called an act of hostility to England for the German Emperor to congratulate the Head of a friendly State on having beaten armed bands, which had entered his country illegally and had been declared 'outlaws' by the British Government itself. Moreover, Germany had a right to speak of the independence of the South African Republic, since that had been recognised in the Convention concluded by England with that State in 1884, except for the minor restriction on Art. IV. I considered the British Press in the wrong in speaking of England's suzerainty over the South Africa Republic, after this had been formally and in essence removed by that Convention.


Private for Baron von Holstein.

...Lord Salisbury was very friendly to-day and assured me emphatically that there was no fear of anything further being done against the Transvaal. His chief fear was that Jameson's life was in danger, as this, so he says, would make his task here immeasurably more difficult. He expressed no wish, but I have no doubt that he would be very grateful if we would suggest moderation to Herr Kruger, or at least advise him to wait.

The very general and deep bitterness in the Press against us seems to be less to-day. I privately advised Lord Salisbury quietly to recommend the newspapers to abstain from further personal attacks on His Majesty, and he promised readily to do this.

He said that he was not yet decided whether he ought not to give expression to the views held here in answer to the Secretary of State's assertion to Lascelles, that England could claim no suzerainty over the Transvaal. I advised him against it, explaining why the claim to real suzerainty could not be completely justified. He said finally that it was best to let the question rest and only to speak of the maintenance of the status quo, that being a subject on which both parties were agreed.


Telegram. Private.

...I spoke to-day to Chirol, the Times Correspondent here and a friend of the Ambassador's, as follows:

'I wish earnestly that the present direct negotiations between the Transvaal and England may achieve their object. Otherwise the matter will go very much further. We Germans could not accept a solution which left us with nothing. It is already clear that Russia will not fail to make use of its one opportunity of exploiting Germany against England. France will be obliged to go with her, in spite of Alsace-Lorraine, because otherwise Germany would usurp France's place with Russia, and a German-Russian group would be a permanent menace to France, against which even the British Navy would be no protection.

'Taking this into consideration, I believe there will be a satisfactory solution.

'The suspicions of a German seizure of Lorenzo Marques are an absurdity. We should thereby bring the French, who set much store by this port on account of Madagascar, on to the British side.

'Up to now British, and even Conservative policy — the attempt at a flare-up on account of Armenia, the refusal over Samoa, the contemptuous treatment of the Italian proposal regarding Zeyla — so long as it lasts, makes of England a useless political factor. It is very doubtful if the Transvaal experience will suffice to make England realise the necessity of maintaining connection with the Continent. Fresh doctrines and fresh personalities will, however, gradually pave the way to this realisation.'

I think that, if the present direct negotiations fail, the Transvaal will suggest a discussion by the Powers; this will lead to further developments. It is important for the world's peace that England should not go so far in her naval demonstration as to give our navy an opportunity for mobilisation, even if only a partial one.

The Russian Ambassador declared here to-day that, by his telegram, our Emperor had spoken not for a German, but for a European interest, and deserved the greatest thanks. The Tsar has also telegraphed direct to our Emperor.


Telegram.

In reply to your private telegram of to-day.

Our only recent information on the negotiations between England and the Transvaal comes from you. The Consul in the Transvaal sends no more reports and is not pressed by us to do so, for we consider that we have done what is required of us, if by our support, so far only moral, the Transvaal is enabled to conclude a decent agreement with England — based on the status quo. We never demanded more than that, as you will have gathered from the account of my conversation with Sir Edward Malet. We do not wish to mix in these direct negotiations at all. If they fail, and the Transvaal applies to the Powers, they will group themselves together in the course of the discussions. We are waiting for President Kruger to begin and shall not ourselves move in the matter with the other Powers beforehand. If the discussions take place, our programme will be limited to the two words "status quo".

It is understandable that Russia is doing nothing to warn London, as it would be greatly to her interest that the Transvaal question should grow into a war now, in which Germany and Russia would be fighting on the same side.


Telegram.

Private for you.  A small White Book ("Aktenstücke betreffend die Südafrikanische Republik") is soon to appear, which will show that we have been for the status quo only from beginning to end. The status quo seems now to be assured. To free the Boers from the Treaty would be to open up a new subject. As regards full freedom of trade for us, we must wait and see what happens later. Apart from the despatch to Count Munster, which you know of, and in which he was especially told to make no use of it, as regarded the Transvaal, we have given nothing about the Transvaal to any Ambassador but yourself, so as to avoid the suspicion of seeking to arouse feeling and support outside.

Undoubtedly we should, if at the eleventh hour the whole of the British possession comes under consideration as material for compensation, be able to offer Russia and France a sufficient reward for their assistance. But you and I agree that the destruction of England's power would be a doubtful advantage for Germany.

Let us be happy therefore, if the affair ends as it seems to be doing — with a small diplomatic success for Germany and a little lesson in politics for England.



The feeling in England, for the moment so hostile to us, and the extraordinary outburst of fury in the British Press have aroused malicious joy here and given rise to hopes.

At first, the French Press maintained a watching attitude and expected the British Press to meet it half-way.

I enclose to-day's leading article in the Temps. It may be considered as semi-official. It points out not only the attempt at a rapprochement by a part of the British papers, but also that they would gladly entertain such an idea here. One can read between the lines that the French Government is hoping to negotiate in that sense. This is not being done in Paris. Lord Dufferin is not in sympathy with the present Government and, like all the rest of us, hardly ever sees M. Bertelot. He never speaks of him except as 'the old chemist', and has a very poor opinion of him as Foreign Minister. The attempt at a rapprochement is being conducted by de Courcel, the Ambassador, in London. Certain English friends have informed me of this fact. They say that in semi-official circles in London M. Bertelot is considered to be the cleverest and most distinguished Minister of the French Republic. This 'distinction' can only mean that he and the Ambassador are trying to flatter them and win them over.

I do not think much of these attempts at rapprochement in themselves, but they certainly should be watched. When it comes to real business, I think these gentlemen will quickly find that the British will be less compliant than they now imagine.

It is very likely that there will be an understanding in Siam and on the Mekong, but not in the East, and particularly not in Egypt. The less value the new school of British politicians attaches to Constantinople and the Straits question, the more important become Egypt, the Suez Canal, Arabia and a dominating position in the Red Sea. There the French will find a noli me tangere attitude, and there French interests and, indeed, French vanity count for much.

The nearer the Turkish Empire is to a collapse, the more Russian influence will increase and spread there, and likewise the importance of the Mediterranean, and especially of Egypt, will increase for England. The break-up of Turkey would make Mohamedanism the most important question for the British in India. The idea of shifting the religious centre from Constantinople to Arabia, and causing a Khalif to be chosen by the Shereefs at Mecca, and of keeping him there or in some other Arabian town far removed from European influence, is one which should prove more and more attractive in England and even amongst the Musulmans.

For realising such schemes and for controlling the way to India through the Mediterranean, naval predominance in the Mediterranean is above all essential. The naval preparations are meant for use against America, although the danger from there is less than it appeared a short time ago. I trust that we are only an excuse. If tempers become calmer, and the Russians and French realise the real purpose of these preparations, the thoughts of alliance and the hopes which politicians on both sides may now cherish, will disappear again. But we must not underestimate the dangers underlying this very complicated situation and must keep our eyes open.


Private letter.

There is nothing new to report, and if no fresh incident happens, it is perhaps to be hoped that the excitement on both sides will gradually die down.

Here meanwhile we have to do with an entirely altered situation, as you will have perceived from the manifestations of the British Press. It is not a question of annoyance on the part of the Government, but of a deep-seated bitterness of feeling among the public, which has shown itself in every way. I am assured that when the excitement was at its height, Germans in the City could do hardly any business with the English. In the best known large Clubs, such as the Turf, there was extreme bitterness; I myself received many insulting and threatening letters.

I have no doubt that the general feeling was such that if the Government had lost its head or had wished for war for any reason, it would have had the whole of public opinion behind it. The suggestion that we could make real trouble for England in other parts of the world counted for absolutely nothing amongst the ignorant mass of the people. England's alleged isolation made no impression. They boasted proudly of it and felt that England was strong enough to defy all her enemies.

I set all this down, because we must reckon with conditions as they are here now, and consider the effect it may have on the British Government. We must not ignore the fact that no Government here — even the present one which is so strong in Parliament — is, or thinks it is able, to set itself against public opinion, when it is shown with a certain intensity. Especially must we reflect that the most serious considerations of foreign policy will never deter any British Government from looking after its interests and self-preservation, before all else. In fact, I once told Salisbury that it seemed to me to be the Government's duty to lead public opinion. He replied that this was harder here than I appeared to imagine.

What is certain is that there has been no attempt to instruct public opinion. It still imagines, therefore, that the British suzerainty over the Transvaal is incontestable, that we intervened out of pure ill-will to England, and that this is doubly unforgivable, considering all the friendship that England has shown us.

On the other hand, it must be admitted that, in face of this feeling, Salisbury did not lose his head, but maintained his conciliatory attitude towards myself in the belief that time would bring calmness.

But I think we must not doubt for a moment that Salisbury has also considered the alternative possibilities and wishes to be prepared, in case either there may be a break with us, or - as he thinks more probable, if not certain - Germany may start a policy decidedly anti-British, and that she is drawing nearer and nearer to Russia, and perhaps also to France, and considers that sooner or later the Triple Alliance will fall apart. The naval preparations, which formerly we should have welcomed, are but a symptom that here they expect difficult times, perhaps as early as this spring, and wish to be prepared for all possibilities. This evident wish for a rapprochement with France is more serious. Recently I mentioned to Lord Salisbury in joke this new affection for France, which must be rather strange to him, and he took up the joke and said that they were only following our example, and did not deny that better relations with France would not be unwelcome.

We now came to the demands regarding Egypt, which were cropping up again in the French Press, and Salisbury said that England could in the end do without Egypt, and that he himself had always been against occupying the country ! I went no further, so as to avoid showing special interest, and therefore did not point out the discrepancy with all his former utterances.

I will here quote a very confidential remark of de Courcel's.

When we mentioned the Togo Hinterland, he went further and proceeded to point out that France and Germany might in future be able to agree on several subjects. He added: 'Pour le moment nous sommes grands amis avec la Russie. Mais cela ne durera peutetre pas eternellement.'

If de Courcel is not the only Frenchman who holds this view, which I naturally did not discuss further, and if the British give way over Egypt and let it be known in Paris, they might perhaps consider there whether the stretched out hand should not be grasped. No one can promise us that Russia would certainly oppose such a combination, if she sees that she can only hold France in her hands at this price. But if she does oppose it, and the Franco-Russian friendship becomes looser, we might live to see an Entente Cordiale of the Western Powers - new edition. Public opinion here, owing to the Transvaal affair, would just now be sympathetic to such a solution as this one. This can be foreseen almost with certainty.

Salisbury and I spoke of the anti-German attitude of the British Press and the desire of a part of it for a rapprochement with France. I remarked that it was very curious that the papers did not point out the price to be paid for that rapprochement, and with how little (Togoland, etc.) it had been possible to satisfy us. He replied with vehemence that he had never been able to justify the Volta settlement, i.e., the renunciation of a territory which England had bought for cash from Denmark 50 years before, but he did not deny that this rapprochement with France or Russia would cost a great deal more. It is certain that this consideration counts greatly with him; but it will not stop him from trying to make himself secure in any case and to ascertain at what price, if any, the understanding would be possible, supposing the Triple Alliance dissolves and we lean more and more towards an anti-British policy.

I think it my duty to mark these possibilities, though I may assume that they are already well known, and that we have made up our minds on the policy to be pursued to meet them. If it really comes to this, I think we shall be able to take up the idea of the Three-Emperor Alliance again. If Russia is willing to do this, even to the extent of giving up France, we may have to fear that Austria will resist to the utmost having to entertain the notion, which must involve now, at any rate, Austria's allowing Russia a free hand in the East.

If I had to give my vote, I should say that it is not to our interest either to let the British power be destroyed or to drive England into the arms of France. In my humble opinion we must keep this before us under all circumstances, and at any rate so long as Russia and France hold together, and this, as far as we can judge now, will last a long time yet. Now that we have shown our teeth over the Transvaal, it is our task once again to restore calm so far as we can without giving up our principles, and to keep the same attitude in the great political questions as we did before this occurrence, i.e., to bind ourselves in no direction for the future, so long as neither events nor combinations intervene to force us to take up a position, at the same time allowing us to ensure our own security and advantage.




Our position towards England and the growing suspicion, which the attitude of the British Government and Press are forcing on us, was frankly communicated yesterday morning to the Austrian Ambassador. On the same afternoon, he had, as indeed could hardly be expected otherwise, a conversation with the British Ambassador, which is alleged to have been brought about by chance.

Sir Frank Lascelles' most important utterance was his question whether Herr von Szogyeny believed there was still any idea in the German Cabinet that Germany and England could ever be brought to pull together in future.

Herr von Szogyeny answered with the principal arguments which had been supplied to him by the Foreign Office a few hours earlier, in particular that, in spite of several minor disagreements, Germany had until recently held fast to the view that in any great future conflict England would be forced by her own interests on to the anti-French, i.e., the German side. But in the last six weeks this view, which had been a basic principle of German policy, had been shaken by England's attitude. England had passed over President Cleveland's Message to Congress and had answered it with soft words and material concessions. The Anglo-French Siam Treaty bore witness to a similar conciliatory feeling towards France. The whole bitterness of British sentiment was directed against Germany. Though the German Emperor's telegram was in point of brusqueness far behind the Cleveland Message, it had been magnified into an insult, for which hardly any atonement was possible. Germany was beginning to think that the whole Transvaal question was nothing but an excuse for paying off other scores against Germany, mainly commercial. The German Government refused to believe it possible that serious British politicians attributed to it a scheme for planting itself at Delagoa Bay, between Madagascar and British territory. In this temper Germany was following very attentively the Egyptian question, which was now apparently springing to life again. If, even in that part of the world, England was not hesitating to make sacrifices for the sake of a rapprochement with France, it would be taken in Berlin as a clear proof that England was ready to pay any price in order to have her hands free against Germany; and she would then lose no time in drawing her conclusions from these premises.

The British Ambassador declared to the Austrian Ambassador that he knew nothing of any Egyptian negotiations, and he could not imagine that in London they would enter on any such just now.




Though for a number of years my personal relations with the Prime Minister have been intimate, and I am thus able to say many things, which he takes as being meant in a friendly and purely personal spirit, yet, as things are, I could not think it right, by any ill-considered words, to make it appear as if we were longing to be reassured regarding Lord Salisbury's future policy. And I think I ought now to mention that the irritation against us, which resulted from the complications in South Africa, has not yet quite subsided; it appears even in Lord Salisbury, who otherwise takes an objective view of the affair, and he does not always speak to me with the frankness to which I have been accustomed for years. This was still more marked in other British statesmen, and I might mention that the First Lord of the Admiralty, Goschen, who is a personal friend, has so far avoided a meeting, although I let my wish for one be made known to him. I should not think it advisable to have any conversation with Mr. Chamberlain who is very prominent just now, although I know him well, for his views are pretty stiff. He has no particular sympathy with Germany or her policy, and an exchange of views between us would only lead to a further sharpening of existing differences.

Under these circumstances I hope that Your Highness will approve of my having lately maintained a certain reserve in dealing with the British statesmen, as I thought right for the above reasons. My Austrian and Italian colleagues, who have not the same reasons for caution, have kept me informed all the time of their observations.

I have had another special reason, which I ought to mention, for being rather cautious in my speech with the Prime Minister. It is a peculiarity of his character that he is afraid of any pressure and draws within himself, the more he thinks that one is trying to persuade him to do what he does not like. I have therefore made it a rule, in the interests of the case, to avoid giving him that impression, and have more than once had the satisfaction of seeing him come to meet me of himself and start discussing matters which he would certainly have avoided, had I pressed him.

Finally Your Highness might allow me to mention another saying of the Prime Minister's in our last conversation, which I think not uninteresting. He said that he had heard with satisfaction that we considered the restoration of our former friendly and confidential relations with England desirable, and that he shared this wish in every way. He had recently written in this sense to Sir Frank Lascelles, adding that he did not believe the offence was his, if there had been a passing difference.

On this I reminded the Minister, as I had often told him, that in many ways, such as his Armenian policy, he had given cause for a certain amount of perplexity as to his political aims. Lord Salisbury replied that he well knew we had felt a certain amount of suspicion of him, and that arrierepensees had been ascribed to him which were quite foreign to his thoughts. It had been a matter of frequent experience to him that abroad, where England's domestic politics and the relations between her political parties were little understood, they completely mistook the attitude adopted by the British Cabinet in individual foreign questions and the reasons for it. If I would ask him why he had done this or that, for instance in the Armenian question which I had mentioned, he could in three words give me an exhaustive and perfectly true reason — parcequeje n'ai pas envie de perdre ma majorite. If other underlying reasons were sought for, which could not be brought into harmony with British foreign policy which only considered the near future, and then only with reference to the political situation at home, the explanation must be unfamiliarity with the conditions under which a British Cabinet was able to govern.

---